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I. INTRODUCTION
“Antonio Romero is what my mother calls me. Antonio Romero is also how I
am known to many of my friends and family members. Unfortunately, the name
Antonio Romero also appears on a U.S. Treasury Department list titled ‘Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.’”1
Imagine you are the director of a non-profit charitable organization. You and
your staff are dedicated to providing health and welfare services to your community.
The government has instructed you to investigate the background of all your
employees by annually comparing their names to a U.S. terrorist watch list. To your
surprise, you discover a key member of your staff has a name that matches a name
on the list. Is this employee a terrorist? Should you tell him his name matches a
name on this list? Should you turn his name over to the government, despite the fact
that you know this terrorist watch list is plagued with error?2 The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) would have faced this very dilemma had it followed a
requirement implemented by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) calling for
the ACLU and other organizations to compare the names of their employees to
names on terrorist watch lists as a condition of participation in a national charity
drive.3 Had the ACLU followed the mandate, it would have discovered the name of
its executive director, Anthony “Antonio” Romero, listed on the Department of
Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals List.4
The Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) is an annual charity drive in which
federal employees make charitable donations to non-profit organizations through
payroll deductions.5 In October 2003, the federal government began requiring non1

Anthony D. Romero, You, Too, Could be a Suspected Terrorist, WASH. POST, Aug. 17,
2004, at A15. Anthony “Antonio” Romero is the Executive Director of the ACLU and has the
misfortune of having his name appear on a terrorist watch list. Romero is not a terrorist, nor is
he suspected of transacting with terrorists.
2

Eric Lichtblau, Papers Show Confusion As Watch List Grew Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2004, at A9.
3

Brad Wolverton, Federal Campaign Flap, THE CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 19, 2004, at

4

Romero, supra note 1.

11.

5

Adam Liptak, A.C.L.U. Board is Split Over Terror Watch Lists, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2004, at A1.
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profit organizations that receive funds through the CFC to compare the names of
their employees against the names on terrorist watch lists and then notify the federal
government of any matches.6 If an organization refuses to abide by this mandate, it
is prohibited from soliciting and receiving donations through the CFC.7
This new requirement presents a question of first impression for the courts.
When the issue makes its way into a courtroom,8 the courts may be tempted to follow
the analysis of Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 9 by
considering the issue under the public forum doctrine of the First Amendment.10
This note recommends that the courts refrain from a First Amendment analysis and
instead consider the new requirement under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits the government from
affording a gratuitous benefit on the condition that the beneficiary relinquish a
constitutional right.11 For example, when Congress attempted to condition
distribution of federal grant dollars on an educational broadcasting station’s
willingness to cease editorializing, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had
imposed an unconstitutional condition on the station’s right to free speech.12 The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prevents the Government from “subtly
pressuring citizens, whether purposely or inadvertently, into surrendering their
rights.”13
The following analysis of the new CFC requirement under the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions reveals that the federal government is conditioning a
benefit—participation in the CFC—on the participating organizations’ willingness to
surrender their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches of
private business records. Because this is exactly the type of government abuse the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is intended to prevent, the courts should declare
this condition unconstitutional and prohibit the OPM from further enforcing the rule.
The new CFC requirement presents a compelling opportunity for the courts to
develop the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The Supreme Court first
invoked the doctrine to remedy the problem of state acts that conditioned economic
privileges on a corporations’ willingness to surrender constitutional rights.14 A half6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Jacqueline L. Salmon, Groups Sue OPM on Terrorism Rule; Charities Told to Screen
Workers, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2004, at A35 (reporting that 13 national organizations filed
suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to block enforcement of the new
Campaign requirement).
9

473 U.S. 788 (1985).

10

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797.

11

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415
(1989) (citing to Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) and W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910)).
12

FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).

13

Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2004).

14

Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1416.
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century later, the Court employed the doctrine to bar government measures that
restricted individual liberties.15 The new CFC requirement triggers a new use for the
doctrine: a government act that suppresses one individual right as a condition of
exercising another. Although the context of this new requirement varies from the
“classic” unconstitutional condition fact pattern, it poses the very same question that
the doctrine was created to resolve: the constitutionality of a government act that
suppresses citizens’ rights. For this reason, the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions is the appropriate framework for analyzing the constitutionality of the
new CFC requirement.
This note addresses the question of whether a federal agency operating under the
authority of the executive branch can constitutionally condition the right to
participate in the CFC on agreement to voluntarily search private business records,
an act ordinarily subject to the Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial review.
The analysis is organized into six sections. Part II explores the history of the CFC,
the campaign’s new requirement, and the development and use of terrorist watch
lists. Part III examines Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,16
the sole Supreme Court opinion analyzing constitutional issues arising under the
CFC. Although Cornelius is relevant for the present analysis in that the Court
determined participation in the CFC is protected speech, Part III makes clear that the
new CFC requirement is distinguishable from the facts in Cornelius and, therefore,
requires consideration under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine rather than the
First Amendment.
Parts IV and V scrutinize the new requirement under the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. Part IV details the history and the analytical framework
of the doctrine, and Part V presents the analysis. Part VI unearths further
justifications for expanding the use of the doctrine, specifically that the CFC
condition is particularly malignant, the Constitution protects equally in times of war
and peace, and the terrorist watch lists are wholly unreliable. Part VII concludes that
the CFC’s new requirement of conditioning the exercise of one right on the
submission of another right is an unconstitutional condition and the courts should bar
continued enforcement of the rule.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Combined Federal Campaign
The CFC is an annual charity drive that provides federal employees with the
opportunity to make monetary contributions to non-profit charitable organizations
through payroll deductions.17 The CFC is administered by the OPM,18 an
independent executive agency that oversees human resource matters for the

15

Id.

16

473 U.S. 788 (1985).

17

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 790.

18

U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
REGULATIONS & GUIDANCE, available at http://www.opm.gov/cfc/opmmemos (last visited
Aug. 1, 2005).
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executive and legislative branches.19 Every year, non-profit organizations apply to
participate in the program; the groups approved for participation are listed in a book
distributed to all federal employees.20 The employees who elect to contribute to any
of the listed organizations fill out a type of pledge card, designating the organizations
they would like to support and the dollar amount they intend to contribute.21 This
amount is then deducted from the employee’s paycheck and sent to the designated
organizations.22 Ten thousand charities participate in the CFC, and over a million
federal employees donate approximately $250 million annually through the
program.23
This federal workplace giving program was first brought to life under the
Eisenhower Administration.24 Prior to 1957, charitable fundraising in the federal
workplace was conducted on an ad hoc basis.25 Charitable organizations individually
sought permission from various worksite managers to solicit funds from federal
employees in their workplace.26 Due to the increasing number of groups seeking
donations throughout the year, this fundraising process disrupted the work
environment and raised the level of confusion among employees who were not
always familiar with the different groups soliciting money.27 In 1957, President
Eisenhower responded to this mayhem by creating an advisory committee to set forth
uniform guidelines for charitable solicitations in the workplace, essentially the
predecessor of the CFC.28
In 1961, President Kennedy abolished the advisory committee created by
Eisenhower and directed the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission to oversee
fundraising in the federal workplace,29 the program that became known as the
Combined Federal Campaign.30 The stated purpose of this newly designed program
was to provide an opportunity for “national voluntary health and welfare agencies . . . to
solicit funds from Federal employees and members of the armed forces at their
places of employment . . . .”31 Over the next two decades, federal regulations were
19

U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, OPM GOALS, available
http://www.opm.gov/html/goals.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter OPM GOALS].

at

20

Plaintiff’s Complaint at 10-11, Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. United States Office
of Pers. Mgmt. (D.D.C.) (No. 1:04cv1958) available at http://www. aclu.org/SafeandFree/
SafeandFree.cfm?ID=16984&c=206 (Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter ACLU Complaint].
21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Wolverton, supra note 3.

24

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 792.

25

Id. at 791.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 792.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

ACLU Complaint, supra note 20, at 8.

31

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 792 (citing Exec. Order No. 10,927, 3 C.F.R. 454 (1959-1963)).
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implemented to govern the CFC, and in 1978, the OPM assumed the responsibility
for administering the program.32 The CFC currently provides the only opportunity
for charitable organizations to solicit federal employees at their place of work.33
During the Reagan Administration, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), joined by other legal defense
organizations, filed three lawsuits challenging the manner in which the OPM
administered the CFC.34 The first lawsuit successfully challenged the eligibility
criteria used to determine which charitable organizations were qualified to
participate in the CFC; the second lawsuit unsuccessfully challenged the manner by
which the OPM distributed some of the funds collected through the CFC.35 In
response to these first two legal challenges, President Reagan amended Kennedy’s
1961 executive order in an effort to clarify both the purpose of the program and the
manner in which it was to be administered.36 Reagan specified that the purpose of
the CFC was to “support and facilitate fund-raising on behalf of voluntary agencies
through on-the-job solicitations of Federal employees and members of the uniformed
services, and to ensure that the recipient agencies are responsible in the uses of the
moneys so raised.”37 Reagan granted the Director of the OPM the authority to
determine which charitable groups satisfied the CFC eligibility requirements, and
then limited the types of groups eligible to participate to “voluntary, charitable,
health and welfare agencies that provide . . . direct . . . services to individuals or their
families.” 38 This limited definition excluded legal defense organizations, like the
NAACP, from participating in the CFC, and thus gave rise to the third legal
challenge in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.39
B. The New Requirement of the CFC
In October 2003, the OPM began requiring non-profit organizations that receive
funding through the CFC to “certify that they do not knowingly employ individuals
or contribute funds to entities or persons on either the Department of Treasury’s
Specially Designated Nationals List or the Terrorist Exclusion List.”40 The OPM

32

Id. at 792-93.

33

ACLU Complaint, supra note 20, at 8.

34

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 793.

35

Id. (referring to NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Campbell, 504 F.Supp. 1365
(D.D.C. 1981) and NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 560 F.Supp. 667
(D.D.C. 1983), respectively).
36

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 795.

37

Exec. Order No. 12,353, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,785 (Mar. 25, 1982).

38

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 794-95 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,353, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,785
(Mar. 25, 1982)).
39

473 U.S. 788.

40

U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, CFC MEMORANDUM 2003-10 (Oct. 3, 2003),
available at http://www.opm.gov/cfc/opmmemos/2003/2003-10.asp (last visited Aug. 1,
2005). See COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN, 2005 APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR NATIONAL/
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATIONS, NO. 3206-0131, at p. 4, available at http://www.opm.gov/cfc/
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explains that this new mandate is “required under the authority of Executive Order
13,224 and OPM’s plenary authority to administer the CFC.”41 The agency further
describes the requirement as following the best practices guidelines published by the
U.S. Department of the Treasury.42
On September 25, 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13,224,
prohibiting U.S. persons from transacting or dealing with individuals and entities
controlled by or otherwise associated with specially designated terrorists. This Order
also blocks the property interests and assets of the named terrorists or terrorist
supporters.43 In response to Executive Order 13,224, the Department of the Treasury
blocked the assets of three charities believed to have ties to terrorist organizations.44
Arab American and American Muslim charitable organizations, concerned about
the prospect of having their assets blocked, subsequently sought guidance from the
Treasury Department on how to avoid this type government interference in their
activities.45 The Department published the U.S. Department of the Treasury AntiTerrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.—Based
Charities46 (Treasury Guidelines) to advise charitable organizations on how to
minimize the likelihood that their charitable funds would be diverted for terrorist
activities.47 The Treasury Guidelines advise charities to engage in best practices,
such as maintaining an appropriate governing structure and making public the names
of members of the board of directors, key employees, and affiliate organizations that
receive funding from the charity.48 Furthermore, charities are advised to maintain
detailed personnel records of key employees, including home addresses and social
docs/2005nationalfederationapplication.doc (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). See also Wolverton,
supra note 3 (reporting on the new CFC requirement and the charities’ responses to the rule).
41

U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, CFC MEMORANDUM 2004-12 (Nov. 24,
2004) available at http://www.opm.gov/cfc/opmmemos/2004/2004-12.asp (last visited Aug. 1,
2005) [hereinafter CFC MEMORANDUM].
42

Id. (referring to U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S. – BASED
CHARITIES, available at http://www.treas.gov/ press/releases/ docs/ tocc.pdf (last visited Aug.
1, 2005)).
43

Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).

44

CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41; Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing.:
Hearing Testimony Before the House Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations,
108th Cong. (June 16, 2004) (statement of R. Richard Newcomb, Dir., Office of Foreign
Assets Control U.S. Dept. of the Treasury). Newcomb testified that the Treasury Department
blocked the assets of the Holy Land Foundation, the Benevolence International Foundation,
and the Global Relief Foundation.
45

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, PO-3607 (2002), available at
http://www.treas.gov /press /releases/po3607.htm (Aug. 1, 2005).
46

OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, U.S. DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S. –
BASED CHARITIES, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/tocc.pdf (last visited
Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter TREASURY GUIDELINES].
47

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 45.

48

TREASURY GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 2.
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security numbers.49 The Treasury Guidelines suggest that any U.S. charities that
provide funding to foreign organizations verify that the foreign recipient does not
appear on U.S. terrorist watch lists.50 What is notably absent from the Treasury
Guidelines, however, is the very requirement that the OPM alleges to have adopted
from these Guidelines—that charities engage in the ongoing practice of comparing
names of employees against the names on the terrorist watch lists.51
In November, 2004, the OPM issued a memorandum advising charitable
The
organizations on how to comply with the new CFC requirement.52
memorandum provides that charities planning to participate in the CFC must, at a
minimum, annually compare the names of their employees to two terrorist watch
lists53 and sign a certification verifying that none of the names of their employees
appear on these lists.54 If an organization determines that an employee has a name
matching a name on one of the two lists, the organization may not sign the
certification and will be denied participation in the CFC.55 Furthermore, if at
anytime after the certification has been signed the organization determines that an
employee has a name matching a name on one of the terrorist watch lists, the
organization is to notify the OPM, and the agency will suspend disbursement of CFC
funds.56
C. Terrorist Watch Lists
The term “terrorist watch list” is a catchall phrase referring to more than a dozen
lists, maintained by nine federal agencies, containing names used by terrorists,
suspected terrorists, or individuals who may know terrorists.57 While all the lists
share the common purpose of curbing future terrorist acts, the specific purpose that
each list serves and the procedure by which names are compiled vary among the
federal agencies managing the lists.58 For example, the terrorist watch list
maintained by the Transportation Safety Administration serves the purpose of
49

Id. at 3.

50

Id. at 5.

51

See TREASURY GUIDELINES, supra note 46.

52

CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41.

53

Id.; see also Brad Wolverton, Federal Charity Drive Explains How Controversial Rule
Works, THE CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Dec. 9, 2004, at 12.
54

CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS CHALLENGES IN
CONSOLIDATING TERRORIST WATCH LIST INFORMATION, OIG-04-31, at 4 (2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb /assetlibrary/OIG-04-31_Watch_List.pdf [hereinafter DHS
INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT]. The report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the
Department’s statutorily mandated responsibility of consolidating the multiple watch lists
maintained by different federal agencies. Id. One of the most alarming weaknesses identified
by the Inspector General’s report is the lack of privacy with list management. Id.
58

Id.
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barring individuals thought to be terrorist threats from traveling on passenger
airplanes.59 The terrorist watch list maintained by the Department of Treasury
identifies individuals and organizations whose property is blocked in the U.S. and
with whom U.S. citizens are barred from transacting.60 The Specially Designated
Nationals List, maintained by the Department of the Treasury, and the Terrorist
Exclusion List, maintained by the Department of State and the Department of Justice
(collectively, “terrorist watch lists”) are the two lists the OPM requires charitable
organizations to consult as a condition to receiving CFC funds.61
The reliability of these terrorist watch lists is questionable at best. Many of the
names on the lists lack specific identification information, such as a date of birth,
social security number, or last known address.62 This lack of specificity leaves open
the real possibility for misidentification.63 One of the more notable examples of a
terrorist misidentification happened to Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts.
Between March 1 and April 6, 2004, airline employees tried to bar Senator Kennedy
from boarding flights because “Edward Kennedy” appeared on a terrorist watch
list.64 Unfortunately, if a name mistakenly appears on one of these terrorist watch
lists or a name on a list matches that of an innocent person, the federal government
has no effective procedure for either removing the name from the list or
authenticating which specific individual the list is attempting to identify.65
In addition to misidentification, the Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General identified individual privacy as a leading concern in the
maintenance and consolidation of the various terrorist watch lists.66 Specifically, the
Inspector General reported concerns with the Department of Homeland Security’s
failure to implement an overarching privacy policy to govern the nine different
59

Glenn Frankel & Sara Kehaulani Goo, U.S. Alert Prompts British Plane to Turn Back;
Passenger Carrying French Passport Is Questioned in London and Released, WASH. POST,
Jan. 13, 2005, at A16.
60

Watch Watch Lists; Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, SEC. INT. NEWS, Sept. 20, 2004.

61

CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41.

62
Ann Davis, Far Afield: FBI’s Post-Sept. 11 ‘Watch List’ Mutates, Acquires Life of Its
Own, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2002, at A1; Romero, supra note 1.
63

Romero, supra note 1; Rachel L. Swarns, Senator? Terrorist? A Watch List Stops
Kennedy at Airport, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at A1. The ACLU researched a sample of
names found on the Department of Treasury’s watch list to demonstrate the potential for
misidentification: “Juan M. Cruz” is also the name of a member of the Atlanta Braves and the
name of over 100 individuals listed in Florida; “Charles Taylor” is also the name of a member
of Congress and the name of a professor at Stanford University and a professor at
Northwestern University; and “Oscar Hernandez” is also a name shared by more than 200
individuals living in Texas and Florida.
This information is available at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/Safeand Free.cfm?ID=16990&c=207 (last visited Aug. 1,
2005).
64
Charlie Savage, No-Fly List Almost Grounded Kennedy, He Tells Hearing, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 20, 2004, at A2.
65

Plaintiff’s Complaint at 8, Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin. (D. Wash.), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/greenvtsa40604.cmp.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
66

DHS INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 57, at 27.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

9

698

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:689

federal agencies maintaining terrorist watch lists.67 Given these reliability problems
stemming from the compilation and maintenance of the terrorist watch lists, it is a
wonder why the OPM is prepared to exclude CFC participation based on the
accuracy, or inaccuracy, of these lists.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
A. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Both the acts of soliciting funds and contributing funds through the CFC are
protected speech, governed by the public forum doctrine of the First Amendment.68
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund69 held that the federal
government did not violate the First Amendment by excluding legal defense and
public advocacy groups from participating in the CFC.70 In Cornelius, the NAACP
and other legal defense organizations brought an action against the OPM to
challenge their threatened exclusion from the CFC after President Reagan limited
participation in the CFC to “voluntary, charitable, health and welfare agencies that
provide or support direct health and welfare services to individuals or their
families.”71 Reagan explicitly excluded organizations that “seek to influence the
outcomes of elections or the determination of public policy through political activity
or advocacy, lobbying, or litigation on behalf of parties other than themselves.”72 As
the Cornelius plaintiffs were all legal defense funds which influenced public policy
through political activity, advocacy, lobbying and litigation, these groups stood to be
excluded from continued participation in the CFC.73
The Cornelius Court analyzed the CFC under the First Amendment’s public
forum doctrine, a doctrine that provides an analytical framework for determining
“when the Government’s interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended
purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other
purposes.”74 The Court determined that the CFC, not the federal workplace, was the
forum in which speech took place75 and that the CFC was a “non-public forum.”76
The government is afforded broad discretion in restricting speech in a non-public
forum;77 speech regulations in a non-public forum need only be “reasonable,” as long
67

Id.

68

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799.

69

473 U.S. 788.

70

Id. at 813.

71

Id. at 795 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,353, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,785 (Mar. 25, 1982)).

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 800; see also O’Neill, infra note 77, at 284.

75

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.

76

Id. at 806; see also O’Neill, infra note 77, at 286-87.

77

Kevin Francis O’Neill, A First Amendment Compass: Navigating the Speech Clause with
a Five-Step Analytical Framework, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 225, 287 (2000).
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as the government is not attempting to restrict the content of speech because it
disagrees with the message.78 Upon recognizing that the purpose of excluding
groups that engage in political advocacy, lobbying, or litigation was to minimize
disruption in the workplace, Cornelius determined the government’s exclusion of
these organizations from the CFC to be reasonable.79
B. The CFC Requirement is Distinct From the Issue Addressed in Cornelius
Until recently, the courts have not been presented with a constitutional question
arising from the CFC since Cornelius. On November 10, 2004, the ACLU along
with twelve other organizations sued the OPM and the CFC Director on the grounds
that the new CFC requirement is unconstitutional.80 The plaintiffs assert that the
requirement violates their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments, specifying
that the condition places “a vague, unreasonable, and unconstitutional burden on
[their] expressive and associational activities.”81
While the courts may be tempted to apply the First Amendment analysis used in
Cornelius, the attendant facts do not invoke the same issues addressed in that
opinion. In Cornelius, the federal government excluded groups from participating in
the CFC based on the manner by which these groups provided services.82 The issue
before the Court was whether the federal government suppressed speech by
excluding certain groups from the CFC.83 The present fact pattern is distinct from
Cornelius in that the federal government is not implementing an outright exclusion
of any particular group from participating in the CFC based on the manner in which
an organization provides services. Instead, the government is conditioning CFC
participation on the group’s willingness to compare private employee lists to names
on terrorist watch lists and to turn over the names of employees matching those
names on the lists.84 The result of this factual distinction is that the CFC requirement
is not placing an outright restriction on an organization’s free speech rights; rather, it
is placing a condition on the privilege of exercising of those rights. Thus, the issue is
one of an unconstitutional condition rather than a direct infringement of free speech.

78

Id.

79

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813.

80

Salmon, supra note 8. The twelve additional plaintiffs are the Advocacy Institute in
Washington, DC; Amnesty International USA in New York, NY; Asian American Legal
Defense and Education Fund in New York, NY; Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law in New York, NY; Electronic Frontier Foundation in San Francisco,
CA; NAACP Special Contribution Fund in Baltimore, MD; NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund in New York, NY; Natural Resources Defense Council in New York,
NY,;Focus Project d/b/a OMB Watch in Washington, DC; Our Bodies Ourselves in Boston,
MA; People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals in Norfolk, VA; and the Unitarian
Universalist Service Committee in Cambridge, MA. See ACLU Complaint, supra note 20, at
1-2.
81

ACLU Complaint, supra note 20, at 26.

82

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 795.

83

Id. at 797.

84

Wolverton, supra note 3.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

11

700

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:689

IV. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
A. Background
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that the government “may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests.”85 The doctrine reflects the principle that the government may not
command indirectly what it is forbidden to command directly.86 For example, the
Supreme Court determined that a federal law prohibiting educational broadcasting
stations from editorializing in order to receive federal grant dollars was an
unconstitutional condition.87 In Federal Communications Commission v. League of
Women Voters of California,88 the Supreme Court reasoned that just as Congress
could not directly command a broadcasting station to relinquish its First Amendment
right to editorialize, Congress could not do so indirectly by conditioning a federal
grant on the grantee’s willingness to surrender its right to Free Speech.89 In essence,
the doctrine prevents the government from pressuring or coercing citizens into
relinquishing a constitutional right in exchange for a gratuitous benefit.90
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine evolves each time the government
devises an innovative means for conditioning benefits or privileges. At the turn of
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court first invoked the doctrine to prohibit states
from conditioning economic liberties enjoyed by corporations on the corporations’
willingness to relinquish constitutional rights.91 Fifty years later, the doctrine
reemerged to safeguard personal liberties. For example, the Court ruled that the
85

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Although Perry refrains from using the
term “unconstitutional condition,” the opinion is subsequently cited by later Supreme Court
decisions when defining the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See generally O'Hare
Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716-17 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party,
497 U.S. 62, 69 (1990); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 408 (1984) (White,
J., dissenting).
86

Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1415.

87

League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 402.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 384. The Supreme Court recently ruled that in some circumstances, the
government can constitutionally condition how government grant money is spent. In
upholding a congressional mandate prohibiting a health care clinic from using federal dollars
to counsel patients on abortion, the Court concluded that the Constitution did not prohibit
Congress from choosing to fund one form of speech and not another. See Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991). Although this ruling seems to veer from the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, it does not affect this note’s topic as the CFC funding is not designated
from the federal budget; CFC dollars are raised from the income earned from federal
employees.
90
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (holding that the denial of a tax exemption
for veterans who engage in protected speech will have the effect of coercing the veterans into
relinquishing their First Amendment rights).
91
Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1415. Accord Cass. R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and
Abortion), 70 B.U.L. REV. 593, 597 (1990).
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government could not condition tax exemptions on the surrender of protected
political speech, condition public employment on one’s association with a particular
political party, or condition welfare benefits on consent to work on a religious
Sabbath.92
The most recent development of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and one
bearing direct relevance to the focus of this note, involves a government condition
that individuals relinquish one constitutional right as a condition for exercising
another right. In Bourgeois v Peters, 93 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the City of
Columbus, Georgia imposed an unconstitutional condition when it required
individuals to submit to an unreasonable body search, by means of metal detectors,
as a condition of protesting a controversial military training school.94 Bourgeois
developed the traditional doctrinal analysis by expanding the applicability of the
doctrine to include not just conditions placed on gratuitous benefits, but to also
conditions placed on constitutional rights.
B. Doctrinal Elements & Analytical Framework
An unconstitutional conditions analysis begins with identifying two key
elements: (1) a gratuitous government benefit, and (2) a threatened constitutional
right.95 The “benefit” in an unconstitutional conditions problem encompasses any
benefit that the government is “permitted but not compelled to provide,”96 such as
federal grants, public employment, or social services.97 Although the government
may withhold a gratuitous benefit altogether, it may not deny the benefit “on the
basis that infringes [one’s] constitutionally protected interests . . . .”98 In the past
92
Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1416; see generally Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)
(using the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to prohibit a county public defender from
terminating public employees because the employees were not affiliated with or sponsored by
the Democratic Party); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (employing the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to protect religious freedom in holding that the State of
South Carolina unconstitutionally conditioned unemployment benefits on citizens’ willingness
to work on a religious Sabbath); Speiser, 357 U.S. 513 (holding that the denial of a tax
exemption for veterans who engage in protected speech will have the effect of coercing the
veterans into relinquishing their First Amendment rights).
93

387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004).

94

Id. at 1324.

95

Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1422.

96

Id. Sullivan notes that “current constitutional law treats most governmental benefits as
‘gratuities:’ matters of political grace to be deferentially reviewed.” Id.
97

See generally League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 402 (recognizing that an Act which
conditions receipt of a federal grant on the relinquishment of the right to editorialize imposes
an unconstitutional condition on an educational broadcasting station); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597
(ruling that a state requirement is an unconstitutional condition when the state required a nontenured professor to cease criticizing the Board of Reagents in order to maintain his
employment with a state college); Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (employing the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to protect religious freedom when it held that the State of
South Carolina unconstitutionally conditioned unemployment benefits on citizens’ willingness
to work on a religious Sabbath).
98

Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
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half-century, government gratuities in unconstitutional conditions problems have
fallen into one of two categories: exemptions from regulations, such as tax
exemptions and land variances, or direct subsidies and other “government largesse,”
such as unemployment benefits and federal grants.99 As explained above, in October
2004, the Eleventh Circuit identified a third category of benefits subject to the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine—the privilege of exercising a constitutional
right, such as the freedom of speech and assembly.100
The second component of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a
“constitutional right” such as speech, religion, and property rights.101 These rights
and the unconstitutional conditions by which they are burdened typically possess
certain characteristics. First, the condition used to limit the constitutional right
presents an “either-or” choice, putting the benefit recipient in the position of having
to choose either the constitutional right or the benefit.102 Thus, a situation in which
federal grant dollars are distributed based on discriminatory criteria such as race or
gender will not invoke the doctrine, as these are characteristics to which the benefit
recipient has no choice.103 Accordingly, the second characteristic is that the choice to
relinquish the right or forego the benefit be a “fork in the road [which lies] ahead
rather than behind.”104 The doctrine is therefore more likely to emerge in situations
where the condition takes on the form of a prerequisite.105 Finally, the constitutional
interest that is being threatened must be a recognized constitutional right normally
guarded by judicial review.106 Based on these doctrinal elements and characteristics,
an unconstitutional condition is best summarized as a circumstance in which “the
[g]overnment offers a benefit that it is constitutionally permitted but not compelled
to offer, on condition that the recipient undertake (or refrain from) future action that

99
Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1424-25; see also sources cited supra note 97; see generally
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that a municipal mandate which
required a landowner to donate land to the city as a condition of receiving a variance violated
the Fifth Amendment under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (holding the state could not condition a tax
exemption on a publisher’s willingness to only publish religious, professional, trade, or sports
periodicals).
100

Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1324. This additional category contradicts Sullivan’s
observation that the benefit in an unconstitutional condition is a gratuity that the government is
not compelled to provide. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1422. However, the Eleventh
Circuit poignantly noted that it was committed to barring any government condition which has
the effect of chilling free speech. 387 F.2d at 1324.
101
Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (finding an unconstitutional
condition when a municipality conditions the benefit of receiving government contracts on the
contractor’s willingness to cease criticizing the local government). See sources cited supra
notes 97, 99.
102

Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1426.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 1427.

105

Id.

106

Id.
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is legal for him to undertake (or to refrain from) but that government could not have
constitutionally compelled (or prohibited) without especially strong justification.”107
Following this definition, there are three steps in an unconstitutional condition
analysis. First, identify the benefit and determine whether the government is
permitted but not constitutionally compelled to provide that benefit.108 Second,
identify the constitutional right the individual is expected to relinquish in order to
receive the benefit.109 In this step, make certain that the beneficiary is presented with
a choice; if the condition is based on unalterable trait, such as race or gender, then
the unconstitutional condition doctrine is not the appropriate analysis.110 Finally,
determine whether constitutional standards would prohibit the government from
directly restricting the constitutional right in question.111 If the analysis concludes
that the government may not restrict the right directly, then the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine holds that the government may not condition receipt of the
benefit on the relinquishment of the constitutional right.112
V. ANALYSIS OF CFC REQUIREMENT AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION
The new CFC requirement imposes an unconstitutional condition by demanding
charitable organizations sacrifice judicial supervision over administrative searches of
their private business records as a condition of participating in the federal
fundraising program.113 This condition evades the Fourth Amendment by coercing
organizations into voluntarily producing information for which the government
would otherwise need a subpoena.114
Federal law prohibits any U.S. employer from employing or transacting with
terrorists or terrorist organizations.115 If federal law enforcement officials reasonably
suspect that any of the organizations participating in the CFC are employing a
terrorist or transacting with terrorist organizations, the Federal Bureau of
Investigations is fully authorized to investigate this alleged criminal conduct.116
Federal agencies typically investigate suspected wrongdoing by issuing an
administrative subpoena to compel production of information and documents
relevant to the inquiry.117 The subpoenas are subject to judicial review as a means of

107

Id.

108

Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1423-25.

109

Id. at 1426-27.

110

Id. at 1427.

111

Id.

112

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.

113

See generally Wolverton, supra note 3.

114

Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp.2d 471, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

115

Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).

116

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, H.R. 3162, 108th Cong., 115 Stat. 272, § 501(a) (2001)
[hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
117

Id.; see also Bailey, 228 F.3d at 346.
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ensuring compliance with Fourth Amendment standards.118 The agency issuing the
subpoena may either seek judicial approval prior to serving the subpoena, or, in the
alternative, it may issue the subpoena without judicial approval, and the individual or
company upon whom the subpoena is served may appeal the enforceability of the
subpoena to a court.119
Because the government has no reasonable belief that any of the organizations
participating in the CFC are in fact employing terrorists,120 a government subpoena
would not likely withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge. Therefore, if the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the OPM from obtaining this information directly, the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions prohibits the agency from obtaining the information
indirectly.
The paradigm unconstitutional condition is a government mandate requiring an
individual to give up a constitutional right, such as speech or protection against an
unreasonable search, in order to receive a benefit, such as a tax exemption, welfare
benefits, or even a federal grant. To fit neatly within this model, the CFC
requirement would demand that the CFC charitable organizations permit the OPM to
conduct ongoing searches of their private employee records without a subpoena. The
OPM, however, was far more clever in devising its condition. Here, the government
itself is not searching the private business records of the charitable agencies planning
to participate in the CFC, but rather it is requiring the organizations to conduct the
searches themselves and to turn over the names of individuals whose names match
those on terrorist watch lists. Notwithstanding this distinction, the result is the
equivalent to the paradigm problem in that the government is achieving an ends that
the Constitution otherwise prohibits.
Using the framework provided in Part IV, the following analysis identifies
participation in the CFC as the “benefit,” and the freedom from unreasonable
searches as the “constitutional right.” The analysis establishes that the Fourth
Amendment would prohibit such government conduct if the requirement took on the
form of a direct order rather than the form of a condition. In sum, the analysis
concludes that the OPM is offering the benefit of participating in the CFC, on
condition that the recipient consent to an unreasonable search, an action that is legal
for the organizations to consent to, but that the government could not constitutionally
compel without violating Fourth Amendment protections.121

118

Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp.2d at 495.

119

Id.

120

Tim Kauffman, Dozen Charities Join ACLU in Protesting Watch-List Requirement,
FED. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at 8; see also CFC MEMORANDUM, supra note 41. The OPM has
not expressed any belief that organizations participating in the CFC are more likely to employ
or fund terrorists than any other charitable organization. Instead, the agency justifies the new
rule as a means to ensure charities follow “best practices endorsed by the Administration’s
anti-terrorism efforts and to provide information that will aid charities in achieving
compliance with the law.” Id.
121

See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1427.
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A. Step #1: Participation in the CFC is a “Benefit”
The “benefit” component in an unconstitutional conditions problem is a
gratuitous benefit that the government is permitted but not compelled to provide.122
In the present fact pattern, the “benefit” is participation in the CFC. The CFC is a
charitable program offered by the federal government with the gratuitous purpose of
“support[ing] and facilitat[ing] fund-raising on behalf of voluntary agencies through
on the job solicitations of Federal employees.”123 Although the administration of the
CFC is authorized by executive order,124 the Constitution does not mandate that the
government host the fundraising drive.125 Therefore, the benefit of participating in
the CFC satisfies the first component of the unconstitutional conditions analysis
because it is a gratuitous program that the government is permitted, but not
compelled, to provide.
The typical “benefit” in an unconstitutional conditions problem is generally some
form of a government largesse or exemption from a regulation. In the present fact
pattern, the benefit takes the form of the constitutional right to free speech.126
Although the benefit of participating in the CFC appears to deviate from a benefit in
a typical unconstitutional conditions problem, the Eleventh Circuit recently ruled that
conditioning the benefit of protected speech is particularly deserving of heightened
protection for the very reason that it is a constitutional right.127 In Bourgeois v.
Peters,128 the City of Columbus, Georgia instituted a policy that required individuals
to submit to a metal detector search prior to demonstrating on public property,
outside of the gates of a U.S. Army base.129 In addition to ruling that this
requirement violates both the First and Fourth Amendments, the court also described
this requirement as a “classic ‘unconstitutional condition,’ in which the government
conditions receipt of a benefit or privilege on the relinquishment of a constitutional

122

Id. at 1422.

123

Exec. Order No. 12,353, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,785 (Mar. 23, 1982).

124

Id.

125

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 791-92. The CFC does not fulfill any constitutional obligation
imposed on the executive branch. Rather, it is the product of President Eisenhower’s forward
thinking objective to simplify the fundraising process for both the donors and the solicitors in
the federal workplace. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33.
126

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799.

127

Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1324.

128

Id. at 1303.

129

Id. at 1307. “The plaintiffs in this case are an organization called ‘School of the
Americas Watch’ (SAW) and several of its members, including SAW's founder, Rev. Roy
Bourgeois. The group engages in various forms of nonviolent protest, seeking to pressure the
federal government to cut funding to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security
Cooperation, better known as the ‘School of the Americas’ (SOA). The SOA is run by the
United States Army and housed at Fort Benning, Georgia. It trains military leaders from other
countries throughout the Western Hemisphere in combat and various counterinsurgency
techniques. SAW contends that the SOA bolsters military dictatorships by training their
leaders how to kill, to torture, and otherwise to suppress their citizens.” Id. at 1306.
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right.”130 The court noted that the city’s new search requirement was an “especially
malignant unconstitutional condition” because not only did the city require citizens
to relinquish a constitutional right in order to receive a governmental benefit, the city
required citizens to relinquish a constitutional right, freedom from unreasonable
searches, in order to exercise other constitutional rights, the freedoms of speech and
assembly.131
Like the City of Columbus, the OPM is conditioning the benefit of one
constitutional right, protected speech in the form of CFC fundraising, on the groups’
willingness to relinquish Fourth Amendment protections. Following the rationale of
the Eleventh Circuit, the OPM is, in effect, coercing the CFC organizations into
choosing one constitutional right over another. This type of coercion is prohibited
under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.132
B. Step #2: Requirement to Relinquish Fourth Amendment Rights
The “constitutional right” component in an unconstitutional conditions analysis is
a recognized constitutional right that the beneficiary must forego in order to receive
the gratuitous governmental benefit.133 Although an individual or organization may
waive their constitutional rights on their own accord, the government may not
command or coerce individuals into relinquishing these fundamental rights.134 In the
past 50 years, the federal courts have considered unconstitutional condition cases
involving rights guaranteed by the First,135 Fourth,136 and Fifth Amendments.137
In the present fact pattern, the OPM is seeking information from private business
records in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The “condition” in this fact pattern
requires organizations to compare the names of their employees to names listed on
terrorist watch lists, and to then to notify the OPM when there is a match.138 This
requirement is the equivalent of the OPM issuing an administrative subpoena to all
10,000 organizations who participate in the CFC each year, ordering the
organizations to continuously report personnel information contained in private
business records for as long as the groups opt to participate in the CFC. Such a
subpoena is subject to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard by means of
judicial review.139 However, by conditioning a governmental benefit on the
130

Id. at 1324.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1427.

134

Id.

135

See supra note 92.

136

Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1324; see also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (using the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to analyze the constitutionality of a condition which
required home visits in order to receive welfare benefits; the Court ultimately ruled that the
home visit was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
137

Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.

138

Liptak, supra note 5.

139

Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss4/8

18

2005-06]

UNREASONABLE CONDITIONS

707

organizations’ willingness to voluntarily produce information that would otherwise
require a subpoena, the OPM has effectively side-stepped the judicial hurdles that the
Fourth Amendment would otherwise pose in the government’s quest for this
information. Consequently, this new condition for continued participation in the
CFC emulates that of an unconstitutional condition because the condition requires
the organizations to voluntarily surrender Fourth Amendment protections by
producing information that the government would otherwise need a subpoena to
obtain.
The condition of comparing employee records against terrorist watch lists
encompasses the characteristics typically seen in unconstitutional conditions.140 The
condition presents a choice to the organizations: compare employee lists to terrorist
watch lists or forego future participation in the CFC. The choice to relinquish the
right or forego participation is a decision the organizations will face every year, thus
the “fork in the road” lies ahead.141 And finally, the constitutional interest, freedom
of unreasonable government searches, amounts to a preferred right subject to judicial
review.142
C. Step #3: Constitutional Analysis of the CFC Requirement Under the Fourth
Amendment
Before embarking upon the constitutional analysis of the new CFC requirement
under the Fourth Amendment, it is useful to review the first two steps of the
unconstitutional conditions analysis. The first component of the analysis is the
“benefit,” or “privilege” as described by the Eleventh Circuit, of exercising protected
speech by participating in the CFC. The second component, the “constitutional
right,” is the Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. The
final stage of analysis in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to determine
whether or not the OPM is indeed violating the Constitution when it requires certain
non-profit organizations to voluntarily “search” their business records without
judicial oversight, or whether this search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
If the act is reasonable, then the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not bar
its enforcement. However, as the following analysis concludes, the search is not
reasonable within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment, and the courts have no
choice but to prohibit further enforcement of the regulation.
1. The Fourth Amendment and Administrative Searches
Americans cherish their right to privacy, a right which, in part, stems from the
Fourth Amendment.143 The Fourth Amendment “safeguard[s] the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,”144 by
protecting against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”145 To ensure that law
140

See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1426-27.

141

Id.

142

Id.

143

William C. Banks and M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security
Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
144

Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).

145

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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enforcement agencies comply with the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Fourth Amendment as mandating “adherence to judicial processes.”146
To determine the reasonableness of a search, courts typically balance the privacy
interests of the individual being searched against the promotion of a legitimate
governmental interest.147 Typically, this balance is reached by requiring law
enforcement agents to obtain judicial warrants based on probable cause prior to
searching a person or her property.148 Searches conducted in the absence of a
warrant or probable cause are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
unless the search falls within one of the Amendment’s few exceptions.149 An
administrative subpoena is one of those exceptions.150
Administrative subpoenas are searches conducted for administrative reasons
rather than the purpose of investigating a crime.151 Although still subject to the
Fourth Amendment, the courts hold these types of searches to the less stringent
standard of “reasonableness,” rather than the probable cause standard to which a
typical search warrant is subject.152 In order for an administrative subpoena to
comply with the reasonableness standard, the subpoena must, (1) fall within the
authority of the agency, (2) not make too indefinite a demand, and (3) seek only
reasonably relevant information.153 This reasonableness requirement ensures that
administrative subpoenas are used for a legitimate governmental purpose, as
mandated by the Fourth Amendment, and not exploited as “arbitrary fishing
expeditions.”154
2. The New CFC Requirement is Unreasonable Under the Fourth Amendment
If the OPM used an administrative subpoena as the means to identify employees
whose names match those on terrorist watch lists, rather than seeking the information
by conditioning a gratuitous benefit, the agency’s subpoena would not satisfy the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. It is helpful to understand the nature of
administrative subpoenas when considering this reasonableness standard.
Administrative subpoenas fuel the government’s investigative power, but they are
strictly limited by the fact that they are only enforceable by a court.155 Thus, when
an agency issues a subpoena to compel documents in relation to an investigation of
146

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

147

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).

148

Id.

149

Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.

150

Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp. 2d at 495.

151

Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978); see generally Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp. 2d at
495 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is not confined to literal searches of private
homes, but it extends also to constructive searches such as administrative subpoenas).
152

Gimbal v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 77 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir. 1996).

153

United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).

154

United States v. Bailey (In re Subpoena Duces Tecum), 228 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991)).
155

Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 642-43.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss4/8

20

2005-06]

UNREASONABLE CONDITIONS

709

possible wrongdoing, the subpoena recipient is entitled to appeal the subpoena and
obtain a judicial opinion before the recipient is obligated to comply with the
subpoena mandates.156 Most commonly, these subpoenas are used by agencies with
investigative and enforcement powers, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigations,157 the Occupational Health and Safety Administration,158 and the
Federal Trade Commission.159
The Supreme Court observes that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard for administrative subpoenas (“within the authority of the agency, the
demand is not too indefinite, and the information sought is reasonably relevant”160)
should not be reduced to a formula, because "relevancy and adequacy or excess in
the breadth of the subpoena are matters variable in relation to the nature, purposes
and scope of the inquiry."’161 Using the analysis provided by the Supreme Court, it
is unmistakably clear that if the OPM had used a subpoena to compel information
rather than threatening to revoke the privilege of participation in the CFC, the agency
would not satisfy the reasonableness standard.
a. The Information Sought is Not Within the Authority of the Agency
Neither Congress nor the Constitution confers the OPM the authority to
command private employers to produce information regarding which of their
employees have names appearing on terrorist watch lists. The OPM is an
independent executive agency, created in 1978 to replace the United States Civil
Service Commission.162 The agency functions as the human resources department
for the executive and legislative branches by “serving as the main portal for
employment information and connecting job applicants with Federal agencies and
departments.”163 The agency’s director serves as an advisor to the President of the
United States on matters concerning civilian employment, and is generally charged
with executing Civil Service Rules.164 When the agency assumed the tasks of the
Civil Service Commission, it took on the responsibility of overseeing the CFC.165
The OPM has no regulatory authority over private corporations in this country, nonprofit or otherwise, other than to validate that certain charitable organizations meet
156

Bailey, 228 F.3d at 348.

157

See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 116, at § 501(a).

158

United States v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 84 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration has the authority to issue an administrative
subpoena against an employer for the purpose of investigating violations of workplace health
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the definition of a “health and welfare organization” in order to satisfy the CFC
eligibility requirements.166
Noticeably absent from the authority and duties assigned to the OPM is any law
enforcement or intelligence gathering powers, specifically, the authority to identify
terrorists working for private non-profit corporations.167 The courts have placed
considerable importance on the fact that agencies that do issue administrative
subpoenas only do so under the express authority of Congress and for a purpose that
Congress may order.168 Here, the OPM is not operating under the authority of
Congress. Instead, it derives its authority to implement this requirement from an
executive order and its plenary authority to administer the CFC.169
b. Requirement is Too Indefinite and Not Reasonable in Scope
The Supreme Court maintains that in order to comply with Fourth Amendment
standards, administrative searches and subpoenas will be disallowed if they are not
“suitably specific and properly limited in [their] scope.”170 The requirement of
actively comparing employee names against terrorist watch lists is too indefinite in
time and unduly burdensome to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. First, the mandate, whether by subpoena or as a condition of
participating in the CFC, is quite literally indefinite in time, as the non-profit groups
who participate in the CFC must regularly comply with this requirement for as long
as they choose to continue to fundraise through the program. Second, under this new
requirement, the charitable organizations participating in the CFC are expected to
assume an unduly burdensome task that no other non-profit agency is required to
undertake. Although the OPM asserts that this requirement is consistent with the
Treasury Guidelines for charitable organizations,171 just the opposite is true. The
Treasury Guidelines do not suggest that charitable organizations compare their
employee lists to names on terrorist watch lists. Rather, the Guidelines advise that
only those agencies distributing funds to foreign organizations verify that the foreign

166

5 C.F.R. §§ 950.201 – 950.203 (2005).
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5 C.F.R. § 950; see also OPM GOALS, supra note 19.
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Bailey, 228 F.3d at 349; see also United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 995 F. Supp.
1460 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (ruling the Department of Defense Inspector General was within its
authority to subpoena documents from Lockheed Martin Corp. that directly related to an
investigation of possible overcharges in connection with a government contract to which
Lockheed Martin was a party); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984) (holding that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Office could lawfully subpoena private business records
which directly related to an authorized agency investigation; the Court noted that the EEOC is
only entitled to subpoena documents that are relevant to the unlawful practice the agency is
investigating under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
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Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
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carry out the provisions of the order).
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organizations do not appear on terrorist watch lists.172 With regard to maintaining
personnel records on employees, the Treasury Guidelines advise that U.S. charitable
organizations maintain basic personnel records that include home addresses and
social security records—information that most organizations already keep on file.173
Although federal law prohibits employing or transacting in any way with
terrorists, Congress has not yet imposed an affirmative duty on all employers to
continuously compare their private employee records to terrorist watch lists and to
report any possible matches to the federal government.174 The charities fundraising
in the CFC are being held to an unduly burdensome standard simply because they are
exercising their constitutionally protected right to participate in the CFC. This
requirement, both indefinite in time and burdensome in scope, is far too sweeping to
meet the reasonableness requirement guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
c. The Information Sought Lacks Relevancy
The reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment requires that
administrative searches not exceed purposes relevant to the inquiry.175 The CFC
requirement, whether in the form of a subpoena or an unconstitutional condition,
contains no relevance to the purpose of the OPM or its administration of the CFC.
As stated above, this agency serves as the human resources department for the
executive and legislative branches.176 In carrying out the duties of this role, the
director of the OPM is authorized by the President to “make arrangements for
voluntary health and welfare agencies to solicit contributions from Federal
employees.”177 Federal regulations authorize the OPM to collect certain information
relevant to the eligibility and financial accountability of the groups participating in
the CFC, such as verification of the organizations’ tax-exempt status and overhead
costs.178 The new requirement of comparing employee names to those on terrorist
watch lists bears no relevance to either an organization’s eligibility to participate in
the CFC, or an organization’s financial accountability, and therefore falls outside the
parameters of the Fourth Amendment.
172
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Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
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11 OKLA. EMP. L. LETTER 8 (Aug. 2003) (interpreting Executive Order No. 13,224 to require
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against those identified by U.S. authorities”).
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For the abovementioned reasons, the new condition placed on non-profit
organizations participating in the CFC is unconstitutional. By conditioning an
organization’s participation in the CFC on its willingness to produce information for
which a federal agency would otherwise need a subpoena, the OPM has effectively
evaded its obligations imposed by the Constitution. As the government could not
otherwise obtain this information directly, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
forbids it from obtaining the information indirectly. The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions stands as a bar to this type of government coercion, and courts should
recognize this act as an “arbitrary fishing expedition”179 and prohibit the OPM from
further enforcing the rule.
VI. JUSTIFICATION FOR DECLARING THE NEW CFC REQUIREMENT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
There are three additional arguments which lend further support to the conclusion
that this new requirement is unconstitutional: (1) this type of condition is
particularly malignant, (2) the Constitution governs equally in times of peace and
war, and (3) the terrorist watch lists are wholly unreliable.
A. “[A]n Especially Malignant Unconstitutional Condition”180
As the Eleventh Circuit so aptly declared, when the government mandates
citizens to relinquish one constitutional right as a condition of exercising another
constitutional right, that condition “presents an especially malignant unconstitutional
condition.”181
While the unconstitutional conditions analysis revealed that
participation in the CFC is a benefit that the government is permitted but not
constitutionally compelled to provide, the Supreme Court has ruled that the act of
participating in the CFC is also protected speech.182 By conditioning the charitable
organizations’ exercise of this right on the willingness to relinquish protections of
the Fourth Amendment, the OPM has devised a plan to subtly pressure these
organizations into surrendering a constitutionally protected freedom.
The OPM stated that the purpose of this new requirement is to “ensure that
charities follow best practices endorsed by the Administration’s anti-terrorism efforts
and to provide information that will aid charities in achieving compliance with the
law.”183 To the contrary, this requirement re-designates a far more expansive
interpretation of the voluntary guidelines issued by the Department of Treasury into
a condition of exercising protected speech. The Department of Treasury specifically
notes that its guidelines “do not supersede or modify legal requirements applicable to
non-profit institutions.”184 Furthermore, the Treasury Guidelines do not recommend
179
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OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTRODUCTION TO
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that charities actually engage in an ongoing comparison of employee names to names
found on terrorist watch lists, but rather that any organization who distributes funds
to foreign recipient organizations be prepared to “demonstrate that it verified that the
foreign recipient organization does not appear on any [terrorist watch list] of the U.S.
Government, the United Nations, or the European Union.”185 Using this glaring
misinterpretation of the Treasury’s Guidelines as the justification to coerce charitable
organizations into surrendering either their First or Fourth Amendment protections is
an egregious act, and courts should be vigilant in prohibiting the OPM from further
enforcing the rule.
B. The Constitution is Equal in Times of War and Peace
The Constitution serves the purpose of balancing government authority and
citizens’ rights.186 Defending against the threat of future terrorist attacks presents a
delicate challenge to a free society, namely “how to prevent and punish
ideologically-motivated violence without infringing on political freedoms and civil
liberties.”187 This clash between liberties and national defense sprung to life most
recently after the attacks on September 11, 2001. The executive branch vigorously
sought to expand its intelligence gathering and law enforcement powers as a means
to better equip itself to hunt and capture terrorists.188 The legislative branch, in an
effort to show its unwavering support of deterring and punishing terrorist acts in the
United States, enacted the USA PATRIOT Act,189 which provided the executive
branch with the powers it sought.190 The judiciary is now left with the most vital role
of determining what government acts fall within the parameters of the Constitution
and what government acts do not. This notion of “emergency constitutionalism”191 is
not a new debate, and will likely continue as the nation decides what liberties it will
sacrifice in the interest of national security. Nevertheless, longstanding Supreme
185
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not swiftly enact the Administration’s proposals.” See J.M. Lawrence, War on Terrorism;
Anti-terror Laws in Place; Feds Urgently Implement Crackdown, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 27,
2001, at 5 (reporting that the USA PATRIOT Act was introduced just five days after the 9/11
attacks and was one of the “swiftest-moving” bills in federal legislative history).
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The Act’s introduction states, “To deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States
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purposes.” USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 116; see also Bob Kemper & Jeff Zeleny,
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Court precedent holds that the Constitution rules “equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances.”192
The OPM is not only governing outside its authority as permitted by Congress,
but it is imposing a condition that falls outside the parameters of the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the agency’s goal to support the Administration’s effort to curb
future terrorist attacks, the OPM, administering the CFC under the powers of
executive branch, is bound by the limitations imposed by the Constitution. If the
OPM, or any government agency, suspects that a non-profit agency is employing or
funding terrorists, then any effort to thwart this illegal activity must be conducted
solely within the powers afforded by the Constitution.
C. Terrorist Watch Lists are Wholly Unreliable
The reliability of the terrorist watch lists have posed dreadful problems for
citizens who have the misfortune of having their name appear on one of these lists,
either by coincidence or mistake.193 As described above, problems with these lists
include common names without specific identification such as birth dates, addresses,
or social security numbers,194 non-uniform standards to update the lists and maintain
list privacy,195 and finally, no effective procedure for having a name removed once it
is discovered that a name has been mistakenly added to a list.196 The gravest concern
of the use of these lists as a means for determining which charitable organizations
can participate in the CFC is the known possibility of a false positive.197 If an
organization finds that a job applicant or an employee has a name matching one of
the names on these lists, the organization is put in the position of either not hiring or
terminating the individual, or foregoing the opportunity to participate in the CFC.198
Given the number of problems that the Department of Homeland Security Inspector
General has identified in compiling and maintaining a list of individuals and
organizations known to pose terrorist threats, it is unsound policy to permit the OPM
to use these lists as an impediment to free speech.
VII. CONCLUSION
The efforts of the U.S. government to curb terrorism, particularly after the
devastating attacks on September 11, 2001, have given rise to numerous debates over
192
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how best to protect American citizens within Constitutional boundaries.199 In an
effort to support the Administration’s anti-terrorism efforts, the OPM decided to
condition participation in the nation’s largest workplace fundraising drive200 on
charitable organizations’ agreement to search private business records for names of
employees matching those listed on terrorist watch lists. Notwithstanding the
unreliability of these lists, and the Fourth Amendment standards governing the
acquisition of such information, the OPM stands firm that this new requirement is a
necessary safeguard to securing Americans from terrorism. This recent mandate of
the OPM sparks yet another constitutional debate in the ongoing deliberation of how
best to provide security from future terrorist acts while properly protecting our civil
liberties.201
Central to the constitutional discussions revolving around the war on terror is the
fundamental question of whether anti-terrorism measures, such as the CFC
requirement, truly make us safer as a society. Given that the government has no
grounds to suspect CFC organizations are more likely to employ or fund terrorists
than those organizations not participating in the CFC, there is no compelling
justification for imposing this requirement on these particular charities. Rather than
making a meaningful contribution to securing freedom, this new requirement is more
likely to result in the blacklisting of innocent people from employment,202 and the
drainage of resources from the organizations that provide much needed health and
human services to our communities.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits the government from
conditioning a gratuitous benefit on the requirement that the beneficiary relinquish a
constitutional right.203 Since the OPM could not directly obtain the information it
seeks without violating the Fourth Amendment, then the doctrine forbids the agency
from acquiring the information indirectly by commanding groups to produce it as a
condition of participating in the CFC.
Because the OPM imposed an
unconstitutional condition on the 10,000 CFC charities when it implemented the new
requirement, the federal courts should declare the requirement unconstitutional and
prohibit further enforcement of the rule.
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